





When we examine the decision-making of par-
ticipants in any market, we see that most partici-
pants rely upon some source or sources of
information to enhance the value of their deci-
sions. We also notice that relevant information in
many markets is available from both the public
and the private sector. The public/private infor-
mation mix varies widely over markets. In some,
such as the markets for air conditioners, shoes,
calculators and pre-EPA automobiles, there is
virtually no public-sector information. In others,
such as the markets for labor, financial instru-
ments and agricultural commodities, the public
sector plays a very large role.
The purpose ofthis paper is to explore the rela-
tionship between public- and private-market in-
formation, with particular emphasis on a specific
market with a large component of public-sector
information-the market for agricultural com-
modities. First, we show how public information
both destroys and creates opportunities for pro-
viders of private-sector information. We then
measure the private sector's response to these
new opportunites in the case of three major agri-
cultural commodities with highly-developed spot
and futures markets. Our analysis indicates that
private-information sources correctly forecast
public-sector announcements for soybeans, but
do not do so for corn and wheat.
I. Relationship Between Public and Private Sector Information
In order to discuss the interaction ofpublic and
private information, it is useful to construct a
model ofan information sector. In doing so, how-
ever, it is not necessary that all the real-world cir-
cumstances be exactly duplicated. Basically, the
model involves the development of a commodity
market, the emergence ofprivate firms supplying
information to market participants, and the en-
try of public-sector information providers-due
to the public sector's belief that an inadequate
supply of information is available from the pri-
vate sector. Finally, the model includes a read-
justment by private firms to the new presence of
the public sector.
Private-sector entry
A market for a particular commodity or com-
modity group emerges at some point in time. In
developing countries, this may happen when a
*Economist, Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Pat
Weber.
30
commodity emerges from the traditional world
of subsistence agriculture and is bought and sold
in the market. In developed economies, this may
happen when a new commodity or service is cre-
ated, such as microwave ovens, calculators, stock
options or kiwi fruit.
As a market emerges, so too do information
providers. In some cases, market participants
may conduct their own information search
through discussions with other market partici-
pants; thus the information providers and the in-
formation users become one and the same. This
would tend to be true of very small markets. In
other cases, a distinct set of private-sector infor-
mation providers may arise. Some may simply be
existing firms which expand to cover a new mar-
ket, while others may be new firms. In either
case, resources are organized to provide informa-
tion to a new market when it is profitable to do
so. Private-sector information expands until the
cost of providing the last unit of information is
just equal to its price-or value, when market
participants generate their own information.mation through surveys, the value of the infor-
mation would have to exceed any inconvenience
costs before market participants would have any
incentive to request it.
Public-sector entry
This equilibrium amount of private informa-
tion is provided until the public sector makes its
entry. If the public sector is assumed to aim at
maximizing social welfare, specifically with re-
gard to the use of information as a public good,
then it would be likely to consider available infor-
mation inadequate whenever the private sector is
left to do the job on its own. The public sector
thus would "decide" to undertake the task ofcre-
ating the appropriate information. 1
However, public servants may be just as inter-
ested in their own survival as in social welfare. In
a democracy, high-level public servants are ei-
ther elected by the populace or serve at the plea-
sure ofthose who are so elected. Ifa large voting
bloc wants the public sector to provide informa-
tion to some particular market, public officials
would be likely to pay attention because of their
own interest in re-election. Their willingness to
grant such requests would depend upon the vo-
ting strength (or campaign support) ofthe inter-
ests affected, but also upon their own ability to
justify to others the social subsidy involved in the
public provision of the information in question.
In the case of agriculture, the farm sector's po-
litical power could be expected to generate de-
mands for publicly-provided information on
commodity markets, with this situation being
justified to the rest of society on the grounds of
its contribution to a stable supply of food at sta-
ble prices.
One caveat is in order. Not all participants in
all markets would benefit from the public provi-
sion of market information. Some participants
who benefit from a less-than-competitive market
might suffer if broadly available information
made that market more competitive. Where free-
ly-supplied market information provides a posi-
tive value to market participants, those par-
ticipants would have an incentive to ask for it.
But where the government obtains market infor-
Private-sector response
When government provides market informa-
tion, it disrupts the equilibrium in the production
of private information. To the extent that the
free (or low-cost) government information sub-
stitutes for existing private-sector information,
private providers may be forced to change their
product or to leave the business entirely. But at
the same time, new opportunities can arise from
these private firms. They can provide analysis
and prescription-in other words, translate gov-
ernment statistics into specific market advice in
the form of market letters. They can also sell in-
formation predicting what the next package of
government information will say. Good predic-
tions arevaluable to people who want to profit by
taking positions in advance of any price change
induced by the next release ofgovernment infor-
mation.
This last stagecould be characterized as a mar-
ket with a mature information sector-one
which has reached a second stage ofequilibrium
incorporating both private- and public-sector in-
formation flows. With the completion of the ex-
ternal shock from the public sector, any new
adjustments will probably be relatively minor.
There will always be commodity-market changes
which induce further changes in its associated in-
formation sector. There will also be technologi-
cal changes in the information industry itself.
These may arise from developments in theoreti-
calor applied statistics, such as those which led
agricultural officials to adopt new sampling tech-
niques during the early 1960's or from innova-
tions in engineering, such as the remote sensing
devices which allow satellites to "photograph"
the midwestern corn crop or the Brazilian coffee
crop.
II. Information in the Market for Agricultural Commodities
The public sector probably accounts for a providing information .to these markets over a
greater share oftotal market information in agri- century ago: and t~e prIvate secto: has generally
culture than in any other market except finance. completed Its adjustment to thIS goverm-r:ent
And despite continuing minorchanges, the infor- role. At this point, it would be usefUl. to consI~er
mation sector in agriculturecan appropriately be the institutional background to the ~nformatlOn
characterized as mature. Thepublic sector began sector associated with these commodIty markets.
31Public-sector information
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
provides virtually all the public-sector informa-
tion relevant to thenation's agricultural markets.
(However, the Department of Commerce and
the Federal Reserve provide information on re-
lated economic conditions, and farm officials in
individual states generate data on local agricul-
tural markets). The USDA publishes produc-
tion, price and other data for all major (and
many minor) crop and livestock products. Most
of this information is available free of charge,
and it is widely used by farmers, merchants, and
other market participants.
One of the most useful USDA series is the
monthly Crop Production Report, which con-
tains harvest forecasts for a number of major
crops. Early in the year, farmers are asked how
much acreage they intend to plant to each crop,
and those planting intentions are compiled for
each major crop by state. After the planting sea-
son, Department representatives count the plants
growing in a systematic sample ofall U.S. farms.
Because ofthe comprehensiveness and predictive
accuracy of these surveys, USDA announce-
ments of expected crop production are generally
taken as scripture by market participants.
Private-sector information
The private sector tends to complement rather
than substitute for the public sector, reflecting
the fact that the latter already provides a vast
amount of free and high-quality information. In
the private sector, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween the information that market participants
generate for sale to others in the market. Some
firms generate information in the form ofmarket
letters and market-information services, but oth-
ers- such as large grain companies, food-pro-
cessing firms, and food-brokerage firms-
generate substantial amounts of internal infor-
mation as a means of identifying emerging mar-
ket opportunities as quickly as possible. Because
ofthe difficulty ofmeasuring this type ofmarket
information, the tests performed in the next sec-
tion of this article must be indirect rather than
direct.
Private-sector firms, again, may complement
the USDA both in the collection and the analysis
of raw data. There might appear to be little op-
portunity for private firms in the area ofdata col-
lection since the USDA collects data on
practically every variable of interest to market
participants, but these firms still play an impor-
tant role by filling a time gap. USDA informa-
tion is published at regular intervals-weekly,
monthly, quarterly, or annually-but important
developments often occur between reporting
dates and thereby affect the profit prospects of
market participants. Some firms develop interim
estimates by conducting limited field surveys,
but most develop these estimates by evaluating
the effects of weather, disease or pest develop-
ments on the most recent USDA estimates of
crop production.
Private firms similarly play an important role
by filling an analysis gap. While the USDA pro-
vides some useful analysis in its Situation Re-
ports, it does not usually predict price
movements, nor does it provide market partici-
pants with advice on the positions they should
take in the market. This type of analysis gap is
filled by a number of market letters and services,
each of which is generally aimed at a different
audience of farmers, merchants, or speculators.
III. Measuring the Performance of the Private Information Sector
The agricultural-information sector is mature inspecting private-firms' actual predictions. This
in the sense that it has already incorporated both is doubly fortunate because private-sector sub-
a public-sector entry and a private-sector re- scriber information is often difficult or costly to
sponse. But how successful has the private sector acquire-and frequently difficult to evaluate be-
been in filling the analysis gap and the time gap cause of being presented in qualitative rather
that remain after the public sector has done its than quantitative terms-while much other pri-
job? Wecannot answer in thecaseofthe analysis vate forecast information is simply impossible to
gap, which is not amenable to quantitative test- acquire becauseofbeing prepared only for confi-
ing, but we can make an estimate in the case of dential internal documents.




The test consists of examining the effects of
USDA output forecasts on specific commodity
prices. IfUSDA announcements are fully antici-
pated by market participants, they should not af-
fect market prices, but ifthey are surprises, they
should cause prices tojumpone way or the other.
Thus, from observing the movement of market
prices in response to USDA announcements, we
can infer how well the private-information sector
forecasts those announcements. (Chart 1).
The USDA typically makes monthly forecasts
of the coming harvest of wheat, corn and soy-
beans from midsummer through November each
year. County surveys ofcrop conditions are con-
ducted around the first of the month, and are
then sent to Washington and kept in a double-
locked box until the compilation of the official
estimates around the tenth ofthe month. On that
day, compilers work behind locked and guarded
doors until the state and national totals are tabu-
lated and inspected by a representative of the
Secretary of Agriculture. That individual takes
the approved report directly to the USDA press
room, where it is released immediately. In other
words, utmost secrecy surrounds the preparation
of production estimates for crops which are trad-
ed heavily in commodity markets.
If the USDA were the only source of informa-
tion, a unique price could be associated with any
given crop-production forecast, and prices would
change only after a monthly announcement
changed the previous forecast. In other words,
the world might look something like Chart 1. But
when other reliable information is available the
Chart 1






market-price path will appear more jagged dur-
ing the month and the announcement effect on
prices will be more moderate. In the extreme
case, private-sector information may become so
well developed that the USDA will never offer
any surprises and the announcement effect on
prices will be zero.
In order to estimate this announcement effect,
we examine the monthly production forecasts
and associated market prices for three commod-
ities (corn, wheat and soybeans) for the 1970-77
period. The announcement effect is represented
by the coefficient "b" in the following basic equa-
tion:
%LlP = a + b%LlQ (I)
where %LlQ is the percentage change between
the current month and the previous month in the
USDA harvest forecast, and %LlP is the percent-
age change in the market place between the day
of and the day following the announcement.
(Price is measured by theclosing futures' price of
the post-harvest contract, which is December for
wheat and corn and January for soybeans.) Since
the USDA announcement is always made at 3
p.m. EST, after the close of all spot and futures
markets, this information should be fully cap-
tured by the change in the price between the
close of the market on the announcement day
and the same time on the following day. Also, to
take account of the ceilings imposed on daily fu-
tures' price movements, the terminal price used
in the %LlP figure is the closing price on the first
post-announcement day on which the limit was
not reached.
Some asymmetry is involved in using daily
price changes on one side of the equation and
monthly quantity changes on the other. Howev-
er, an example will demonstrate the appropriate-
ness of our test. Assume that a wheat-crop
forecast is made on the 10th ofJuly, and that the
market accepts this as the best available at that
time. As the month progresses and rainfall be-
comes lighterthan expected, private-information
providers will adjust the July USDA forecast
downward. To the extent that this downward ad-
justment is off the mark and the market is sur-
prised by the new USDA forecast of August 10,
the surprise will show up only in the August 11
price change. Thus, since we are simply trying to
estimate the degree to which the market is sur-prised by the USDA forecast adjustment, this
test is appropriate. If, on the other hand, we were
trying to estimate an elasticity of demand, we
would need to use the same time period for both
price and quantity, and the test used here would
not be appropriate.
A recent unpublished paper by Pearson and
Houck2uses a non-parametric chi-square test to
examine the hypothesis ofan inverse relationship
between USDA forecast adjustments and associ-
ated market-price changes. For the 1963-75 peri-
od, they found that forecast changes and market
prices moved in opposite directions for corn, soy-
beans, and spring wheat, but not for winter
wheat. The current paper extends the Pearson
and Houck tests by 1) using regression analysis
for estimating the magnitude of the announce-
ment effect, 2) expanding the sample period
from 12 to 28 years, and 3) testing for changes in
the announcementeffect through the cropseason
and over time.
Announcement effect?
We obtain the following results from estimat-
ing Equation 1 (t values in parenthesis):
%LlPs = -.632 -.004% Soybeans R2 = .000
(2.43) (0.05) DW = 1.97
SER = 2.36
n = 84
changes in the corn harvest. Note that while the
magnitude ofthe announcement effect is roughly
thesame for wheat and corn, theeffect for corn is
much more statistically significant.3
Much of this difference can·be explained by
technical differences among crops. Soybeans are
a very hardy crop, so that month-to-month
changes in temperature and rainfall affect yields
to a relativeiy minor extent. Corn and, to a lesser
extent, wheat yields are much more affected by
environmental changes. In fact, the variability of
soybean yields is roughly only halfthat ofcorn or
wheat (Table 1). The ranking of the crops by
variability ofyield parallels their ranking by the
private sector's output-forecasting performance,
which suggests that the technical difficulty ofthe
task is the primary factor determining the pri-
vate sector's ability to forecast changes in USDA
estimates.
Table 1





Soybeans 25.52 1.83 .072
Wheat 27.94 3.36 120
Corn 75.12 12.71 .169
While the explanatory value of the equations is
quite low, all ofthe coefficients carry the expect-
ed sign, which implies that price moves in the op-
posite direction from quantity. However, the
relationship is highly significant only for corn,
while it is weakly significant for wheat and essen-
tially zero for soybeans. This suggests that the
private market does a very good job anticipating
changes in the soybean forecast, a somewhat
poorerjobanticipating changes in thewheat har-
vestand a considerably poorerjob in anticipating
%LlPw = .028 -.202% Wheat
(0.10) (1.56)











a) Yield data taken from USDA. Agricultural Statistics
1977
Variation over crop season
As the crop season progresses, the uncertainty
associated with crop estimates decreases. Crop-
production estimates are based upon: 1) an esti-
mate of planted acreage, and 2) an estimate of
yield per acre. While good acreage estimates can
be obtained early in the season, initial yield esti-
mates are subject to change during the course of
the season. As the season progresses, yield esti-
mates involve fewer assumptions and therefore
become less uncertain. Consequently, both the
publicand private sectors should doa better fore-
casting job as the season progresses. Indeed,
throughout the past 28 years, the accuracy ofthe
USDA forecast improved and the variation in
the forecast error fell as the season advanced.
(Table 2).Forecast/post-harvest estimate
July August Sept. Oct. NOli.
Table 2
Accuracy of and Variation in
USDA Forecast, 1950-77
Soybeans .990 .996 .997 .997
Wheat .993 .996 .999 .999 .999
Corn 1.031 1.032 1.035 1.040
Variation in Forecast Errora
Soybeans .080 .043 .034 .027
Wheat .044 .023 .010 .016 .016
Corn .084 .077 .076 .077
While summary statistics similar to those in
Table 2 cannot be constructed for private-sector
forecasts (for reasons explained above), the pri-
vate sector's improvement through the crop sea-
son can be measured in an indirect fashion. If
this sector improves its forecast at roughly the
same rate as the public sector we would expect to
find no systemetic change in the announcement
effect over the crop season. If, on the other hand,
it lags behind the public sector's performance, we
would expect to find an increasingly significant
announcement effect over the crop season.
To test this hypothesis, we estimated Equation
I separately for each monthly change. For exam-
ple, the announcement effect for the July/ Au-
gust change in the corn forecast, estimated with
1950·56 1957-63 1964-70 1971-77
Soybeans .076 .037 .033 .042
Wheat .037 .025 .024 .022
Corn .137 .075 .054 .043
Table 4
Variation in the USDA Forecast Error
Through Time, 1950-77a
the 28 annual observations, can be seen in the up-
per right hand corner of Table 3. Altogether, no
consistent increase or decrease in the announce-
ment effect is apparent over the crop season. This
suggests that the private sector does indeed im-
prove its forecasts at roughly the same rate as the
private sector. However, since forecast improve-
ments over the crop season are due almost exclu-
sively to an easier forecasting environment, it
might be expected that all forecasters would find
themselves improving at about the same rate.
Vari.ation over ti.me
The USDA has taken a number ofsteps to im-
prove the accuracy of its forecasts, and these
measures have led to a gradually improved fore-
cast ever since 1929.4 Even within the shorter
1950 to 1977 period under consideration in this
paper, the accuracy of USDA forecasts has im-
proved considerably, as is evident from the
shrinking variation in the forecast error dis-
played in Table 4. The only exception is a decline
in the forecasting accuracy for soybeans as we
move from the late 1960's into the commodity-
turbulent early 1970's.
~ ~ (forecasti-final)2
m i = I final





Change Soybeans Wheat Corn
July/Aug. c -.218 (I.I -.061 (0.99)
Aug./Sept. -.011 (0.12) 186 (0.78) -.443 (2.16)
Sept./Oct. -.051 (0.25) -.935 (0.77) +.028 (0.18)
Oct./Nov. -.008 (0.03) d - .550 (2.85)
a) Announcement effects are estimates of"b" in Equation I.
calculated for each crop and for each monthly change.
Each estimate is based upon 28 observations for the 28
years of the sample.
b) t·values in parentheses
c) No soybean-crop estimate prepared for July.
d) October/November changes were too small to use for es-
timation.
a) Measure of variation used here is the same as that in
Table 2.
But has the private sector kept pace with these
public-sector improvements? In a test similar to
the one above, Equation I was estimated for each
of four 7-year periods, with the results reported
in Table 5. With only a single exception, the an-
nouncement effect grew increasingly larger and
more significant over time-that is, market par-
ticipants became increasingly surprised over
time. This suggests that the private sector lagged
behind the public sector in improving its forecast.
This might have been expected. Unlike the
forecast improvement over the crop season,
which is attributable to environmental changes,
improvements over time are generally attribut-
35able to actions taken by the forecasting agent it-
self. Because some improvements may be too
costly to be adopted by private firms (since they
may not stimulate a commensurate rise in rev-
enues), the public sector adoption of such im-
provements would tend to enhance its forecast
accuracy relative to the private sector. Examples
might be a move to larger sampling frames or
more intensive physical counts within each
frame. Thus, dueto the profitability constraint in
the private sector, a well-endowed public sector
agency like the USDA might be expected to im-
prove its forcastsat a more rapid rate than the
private sector, thus generating larger announce-
menteffects over time. (A more formal and tech-
nical presentation of this interpretation can be
found in the Appendix.)
Table 5
Announcement Effect Over Timea
Period Soybeans Wheat Corn
1950-56 .021 (0.45) .003 (0.08)b -.017 (0.31)
1957-63 -.134 (1.34) -.016 (0.31) -.147 (1.45)
1964-70 -.315 (2.31) -.198 (1.27) -.229 (2.14)
1971-77 .214 (0.63) -.972 (1.63) - .918 (2.60)
a) Announcement effects are estinlates of "b" in Equation i
for each crop, for each of four time periods. Corn equa-
tions are based upon 35 observations (5 months x 7 years);
wheat and soybean equations are based upon 28 observa-
tions (4 months x 7 years).
b) t-values in parenthesis
IV. Conclusion
This paper was designed to explore the rela-
tionship between the provision of public and pri-
vate information to participants in commodity
markets. We emphasized particularlythe market
for agricultural commodities, since this is a mar-
ket with a large component of public-sector in-
formation.
Whenever public information is considered re-
liable, its release would be expected to have a sig-
nificant impact on the market. However, market
participants have an obvious incentive to predict
such public announcements, since this is equiv-
alent to predicting a movement in prices. In a
mature information sector, private information
providers would become fairly adept at making
such predictions, so that we would expect to find
a fairly weak public-announcement effect. In our
test, however, we found that the private informa-
tion sector did a good job of prediction only for
soybeans. Corn and, to a lesser extent, wheat still
have significant announcement effects.
For technical reasons, public-sector informa-
tion generally improves in quality over the crop
season-and the same appears to be true for pri-
vate-sector performance. However, over time,
public-sector information has improved in qual-
ity, whereas the private sector's forecasting abili-
ty has lagged behind.
This should not be too surprising. The public
sector, unlike the private sector, is not con-
strained by considerations of profitability when
adopting improved methods offorecasting or ex-
panding its survey activities-although ofcourse
it is subject to certain budget constraints. Thus,
in response to constituents and other pressures,
the USDA has been able to improve its forecast-
ing ability more rapidly than has the private
sector.
APPENDIX
The notion that an increasing announcement
effect suggests that the private sector lags the
public sector in increasing its forecast accuracy
has some intuitive appeal. However, a more for-
mal demonstration ofthe conditions under which
diverging forecast accuracy leads to increased
announcement effects would make such a notion
more plausible.
Let G and P represent the forecast error ofthe
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government and private sector respectively. Fur-
thermore, let the government error be written as
a function ofboth the private sector error (to the
extent that both sectors make the same types of
mistakes) and its own unique source oferror, E,
such that:
1) G = aP + E
where a > 0 to reflect the fact that both privateand public tend to make errors in the same direc-
tion, and both E and P have zero mean and some
positive variance, a~ and a~ respectively. As-
sume further that the covariance between P and
E is zeroand thata is independentofboth a~ and
a~. Now, the variance of the government error
can be written as a function ofthe varianceofthe
private error and the independent government
eHor 2) a2 = a2a2 + a2
G P E
Let us take the case where the errors initially
have the same variance and then the variance of
the government error falls, while the variance of
the private error remains unchanged. There are
two ways in which the variance of the govern-
ment error can decline according to equation 2.
Either "a" could fall which would mean that the
government began to rely less on the methods or
data it shared with the privatesector, or a~could
fall because ofincreased public sector reliance on
better techniques or data not available to the pri-
vate sector.
The announcement effect could either increase
or decrease depending upon which of these two
factors, a or <T~, was responsible for the accuracy
of the government forecast. Since the size of the
announcement effect depends upon the expected
difference between the two errors, let us write the
square of that expected difference as
3) E(P-G)2 = (a-I)2<T2 + a2
P E
Clearly, ifthe government increases its accuracy
by reducing the variance of the error unique to
the government, i.e., a~, then the expected dif-
ference expressed in equation 3 will also fall and
the announcement effect will decrease. If, on the
other hand, government accuracy increases be-
cause it improves on a technique used by both
sectors (while the private sector does not make
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the improvement), then "a" falls. Note that 0 <
a < 1since we assumed (1) that government and
private errors were positively correlated which
implies a > 0 and (2) that initially a~ = ab,
which from equation 2 implies that a < 1. Now,
as a positive "a" approaches zero, the expected
difference in equation 3 grows and, thus, the an-
nouncement effect grows larger.
So, it is only an increase in government accura-
cy via a fall in "a" that is consistent with our in-
terpretation in this paper. The question then
becomes whether the actual source of increased
USDA accuracy has been a fall in <T~ or a. For
one thing, private forecasters can sell their fore-
casts partly on the basis that they are good fore-
casts of yet-to-be-announced USDA forecasts,
thus allowing subscribers to take advantageous
market positions. This creates an incentive for
private forecasters to behave in a manner .that
keeps "a" as close to I and E as close to zero as
possible (in equation I). To the extent that they
are successful in this and that there is little E and
a lot of "a" for the public sector to reduce, most
ofthe reduction in thevariance ofthe public sec-
tor forecast would likely come from reductions in
a. Futhermore, the government forecasts are
based upon surveys of farms, while the private
sector forecasts are based both upon farm sur-
veys and the integration of secondary informa-
tion on weather conditions, random media
coverage ofthe farm sector and so on. To the ex-
tent that USDA expands the size or quality ofits
farm surveys beyond that allowed by profitabil-
ity considerations in the private sector, this re-
presents a fall in "a" and an increased
announcement effect. This is probably more
typical ofwhat has taken place over the past sev-
eral decades. (Note: This treatment was suggest-
ed by Patrick Weber.)1.• Apub'ic gOod is one. whose cost of production isun<lffect-
edbythe number ofpeople who consume it. This is to be distin-
guished from a collective good, which (once produced) is
automatically consumed bY ali. (Public safety is. a collective
good.) Information, per se, is a pure public good, since the cost
ofcreating it isthe s"mewhelheritisuSl>d byoneorby "million
people. (Nolethat Whill> the me"sage is a public good,the medi-
um-book, pamphlet or magazine__isa private good.) The
problem with a public good is th<lt the private sector will not
price it at the m<lrginal cost of production-which is zero since
adding a new consumer costs nothing-but will r"ther charge
sOl11e price ""hiGhwill Gover fiXl>dGostsand allo\Na pr()fil,ll is
gener<llly recognized that this is not'optimal, because (once pro-
ducl>d) the information can be provided to.additionalpeople-
i.e. social welf<lre can be incre<lsed-at no additional GOst.
While this suggests that government interventionmay make so·
cietybetter off, it is by no means clear that it would.
The private sector can come fairly close to providing the opti-
mal amount of information if it C<ln charge each consumer a price
equal to the value of the information to him or, more realistically,
if the cosf of creating the information becomes very small rela-
tive to the cost of disseminating it. In the latter case, the portion
of the price attributable to the public good (the message) ap-
proaches the optimal level of zero, while the bulk of the price
charged to the consumer is the price at the private good (the
medium). In the case of paperback books, information costs are
low relative to dissemination costs, and thus the private sector
may be pr()viding close to the optimal amount of information; in
the case of the National Income Accounts, production costs are
so great that the private sector would probably provide consid·
erably less than an optimal amount. Information on agricultural
markets probably lies somewhere between these two extremes,
but closer to the latter.
The classic article on the optimal level of a public good isPaul
Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", Review of
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Economic Studies (November 1954). A recent merging of the
public·goods and economics-of-information literature can be
found in Bruce Owen, Jack Beebe and Willard Manning, Televi-
sion Economics (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974).
2. Daniel Pearson and James P. Houck, "Price Impacts of
SRS Crop Production Reports: Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat," un-
published manuscript, Department of Agriculture and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota, April 1977.
3. The price effect of a change in the harvest forecast should
be rather sensitive to the amount of the commodity currently in
storage. The new harvest does not usually make up the total
supply, but simply adds to that supply-and price is determined
by the intersection of demand and total supply. Since stock lev-
els changed considerably over the sample period, it seemed ap-
propriate to control for these changes. Thus Equation 1 was
modified such that %.!.Q refers to the change in total supply,
where total supply equals July 1 stocks plus the harvest fore-
cast. As might be expected, the size and significance of the co-
efficients and the fit of the equations improve modestly, though
the announced effect for soybeans remains essentially zero.
The new estimated equations are:
%.lPs = .629 -.013 %.lTotal Soy R' = .003
(2.42) (0.15)
%.lPw = .020 -.356 %.lTotal Wheat R2 = .040
(0.07 (1.84)
%.lPc = .059 - .357 %.lTotal Corn R2 = .086
(0.24) (3.16)
4. A moderate improvement in USDA forecast accuracy over
the 1929-1970 period was discovered using different tech-
niques than those in Table 4 by G. Gunnelson, W.D. Dobson, and
S. Pamperin, "Analysis of the Accuracy of USDA Forecasts,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (November
1972).